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Abstract 
Recently, a series of studies demonstrated false belief understanding in young 
children through completely non-verbal measures. These studies have revealed that 
children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false 
belief test, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. The 
current study examined whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), who are 
known to have difficulties in the verbal false belief test, may also show such action 
anticipation in a non-verbal false belief test. We presented video stimuli of an actor 
watching an object being hidden in a box. The object was then displaced while the actor 
was looking away. We recorded children’s eye movements and coded whether they 
spontaneously anticipated the actor’s subsequent behaviour, which could only have 
been predicted if they had attributed a false belief to her. Although typically developing 
children correctly anticipated the action, children with ASD failed to show such action 
anticipation. The results suggest that children with ASD have an impairment in false 
belief attribution, which is independent of their verbal ability.  
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 Introduction 
 
Effective and efficient understanding and prediction of others’ action is critical 
for social interaction and communication and cognitive mechanisms underlying 
effective social interaction and communication have been central to investigations 
within various fields of cognitive science, including developmental psychology and 
developmental cognitive neuroscience. In a groundbreaking paper, Premack and 
Woodruff (1978) proposed that chimpanzees, like humans, infer others’ mental states 
such as desires, intentions and beliefs, and predict and control others’ actions based on 
attributed mental states. They coined the term ‘Theory of Mind’ for this cognitive 
mechanism. However, because in most cases, action prediction based on a theory of 
mind appears the same as a prediction made with a learned behavioural association, the 
original studies reported in Premack and Woodruff (1978) were not conclusive as to 
whether chimpanzees really have theory of mind. To solve this problem, Dennett (1978) 
proposed an ingenious experimental paradigm, known as the false belief task (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). In this false belief task, a 
desirable object, usually hidden in a container, is displaced to another container while a 
protagonist is away. In this situation, theory of mind predicts that the protagonist should 
go to the previous location of the object because she is unaware of the displacement and 
thus has a false belief about the current location of the object. In contrast, a behavioural 
association would predict that the protagonist should go to the current location of the 
object based on an association between the protagonist and the object (Dennett, 1978; 
for an alternative view, see also Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Since then, this false belief 
task has been extended for use also in the fields of developmental psychology, 
psychiatry and psychopathology. In these developmental studies, the false belief task is 
often treated as “the litmus paper” of theory of mind, and sometimes even assimilated to 
correspond to the full capacity of theory of mind skills (e.g. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; 
Zelato, Jacques, Burack & Frye, 2002), despite tapping only one aspect of theory of 
mind (i.e. attributions of false belief). This may be because of its lower susceptibility to 
type-I error (Dennett, 1978), its capacity to capture developmental trajectory (e.g. 
Happé, 1995), and/or the impact of the seminal study of Baron-Cohen and colleagues 
(1985), which reported that children with autism, who suffer from severe impairment in 
social interaction and communication, do not pass the false belief task.  
Since Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), much evidence has accumulated supporting the 
proposal that children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) show atypical 
development of the capacity for ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The most 
consistent finding is that children with ASD, before the verbal mental age of 11 years, 
do not pass various versions of the ‘false-belief’ task (Happé, 1995). Whereas typical 
4-year-olds correctly anticipate others’ behaviour based on the attribution of a false 
belief, children with ASD, at the same mental age or even higher, incorrectly predict 
behaviour based on reality, without taking into account the other person’s epistemic 
states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). This result was interpreted as evidence that children 
with ASD at the verbal mental age of 4 years fail to represent others’ epistemic mental 
states, or at least fail to do so when others’ mental states are different from the child’s 
own. 
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However, two decades of empirical studies and theoretical debate have revealed 
that standard false belief tasks suffer from at least two major problems that could affect 
the interpretation of the results (Birch & Bloom, 2003; Bloom & German, 2000) The 
first limitation of the standard false belief task is that individuals with ASD of higher 
verbal skills, such as older children and adults with Asperger Disorder or 
high-functioning autism, pass a false belief test (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000; 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). However, despite their success 
on standard false belief tasks, they still exhibit problems in less-structured theory of 
mind tasks, such as attributing mental states to geometric shapes on the basis of their 
movement pattern (Abell et al., 2000), or to other people merely from looking at 
photographs of their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001). The second limitation is that, beyond theory of mind abilities, 
most false belief tasks require additional cognitive skills other than theory of mind for 
successful performance. To answer the questions correctly, children need to (1) 
remember the whole sequence of the story, (2) inhibit their knowledge about the actual 
location of the object and, above all, (3) correctly interpret the verbal questioning of the 
experimenter. Such additional task demands may prevent both young typically 
developing children, and children with ASD, from answering the questions correctly 
because of their known difficulty in executive attention (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 
1997; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), or often poor linguistic abilities 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 1981, 2000, 2001). Thus, it 
is not clear whether individuals with ASD, even when they pass the standard false belief 
task, understand the minds of others in the way that typically developing individuals do. 
To address this question, we used a novel, non-verbal false belief task, building 
on a paradigm that was originally developed for studying infant cognition and has 
fundamentally changed our understanding of the development of mental state attribution. 
Onishi and Baillergeon (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) found that typically-developing 
15-months-olds were ‘surprised’ when an agent, who had not seen a toy being moved, 
nevertheless searched correctly for it, suggesting that they attributed a false belief to her 
and expected her to search in the wrong location. This finding is problematic for the 
mainstream consensus that children under 3 years of age lack the conceptual capacity to 
represent others’ representational mental states (Perner, 1995; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004). Building on this finding, we developed a non-verbal version of the 
false belief task, using eye-tracking technology and measuring anticipatory looking. The 
results revealed that two-year-old children were able to correctly anticipate an actor’s 
behaviour based on her inferred false belief (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). 
The aim of the current study was to explore whether children with ASD  
between 6 to 8 years, who were predicted to have difficulty in standard, verbal false 
belief task (Happé, 1995), could correctly anticipate the behaviour of an agent with a 
false belief, like typically developing 2-year-olds (Southgate et al., 2007). This task has 
a number of advantages over standard false-belief tasks. First, because the task does not 
impose verbal instructions or questions on the participants, it is free from any 
confounding factors based on the children’s verbal ability (Csibra & Southgate, 2006). 
Secondly, the non-verbal nature of the current task, along with the measurement of 
spontaneous eye movements, enabled us to record children’s spontaneous response to 
the scene, rather than measuring an elicited response specific to the task structure. 
Thirdly, we removed the object from the scene in order to avoid the potentially 
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problematic reality bias (Birch & Bloom, 2003), which may sway children towards 
responding with the actual location of the object. 
One can make at least two different predictions for the outcome of this study. 
First, if the difficulty of children with ASD on the standard false belief task reflects a 
difficulty in executive attention or verbal understanding, they may pass this non-verbal 
version of the false belief task which largely eliminates these problems. On the other 
hand, if children with ASD do not spontaneously attribute mental states to anticipate 
other people’s behaviour, they should not show anticipatory looking in this task. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Data from 12 children with ASD (1 female, 11 male), as well as 17 
typically developing children (TD; 8 female, 9 male) were included in the analyses. An 
additional 8 children (6 ASD, 2 TD) also participated in the study but were excluded 
from the analyses because of failure to watch the stimulus during recording (3 ASD), 
technical problems (1 ASD), or not reaching inclusion criteria during familiarization 
trials (2 ASD, 2 TD, see Procedure for details). Children with ASD included in the final 
analyses had been diagnosed with Autistic Disorder (6), Asperger Disorder (1), 
PDD-NOS (1) or Pervasive Developmental Disorder (without a detailed diagnosis, 4) 
by at least one child psychiatrist or pediatrician. To confirm their clinical manifestation, 
the Japanese version of the Autism Screening Questionnaire (ASQ-J) (Berument, Rutter, 
Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999; Dairoku, Senju, Hayashi, Tojo, & Ichikawa, 2004) was 
administered to all of the children. All the children with ASD scored above the cut-off 
point (13), and all the TD children scored below the cut-off point. Verbal and 
non-verbal intelligence was measured with the Japanese version of the Picture 
Vocabulary Test (PVT) (Ueno, Nadeo, & Iinaga, 1991) and the Japanese version of 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) (Raven, 1956; Sugishita & Yamazaki, 
1993). Children’s scores for each test, as well as their chronological ages and scores of 
ASQ-J, are summarized in Table 1. All the children were recruited from a local school, 
and written informed consent was obtained from one of the children’s guardians before 
the study. This study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. 
 
Table 1. Mean Chronological Age (CA), Verbal Mental Age (VMA), scores of Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (RCPM) and scores of Japanese version of Autism Screening Questionnaire (ASQ-J) for children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and typically developing children (TD). 
 ASD (n = 12) TD (n = 17) Group difference 
 M (SD) range M (SD) range  
CA 7;9 (1;0) 6;6 – 8;10 7;6 (0;11) 6;5 – 8:10 n.s. 
VMA 6;3 (2;5) 3;0 – 12;0 9;4 (2;2) 4;8 – 12;0 ** 
RCPM 25.1 (6.8) 14 - 35 29.5 (5.1) 20 - 36 n.s. 
ASQ-J 22.1 (5.0) 17 - 33 2.7 (3.2) 0 - 11 ** 
M: average, SD: Standard Deviation, **: p < .01, n.s.: not significant. 
 
Eye-Tracking version of the False Belief Test (ET-FB). A Tobii (Stockholm, 
Sweden) 2150 Eye Tracker, integrated with a 20-inch TFT monitor was used to present 
the stimuli and record eye movements. Stimulus presentation and recording were 
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controlled via a computer with Tobii’s ClearView software. Children were seated 
approximately 50 cm from the monitor. A five-point calibration was completed before 
the stimulus presentation (For technical details about the apparatus and the calibration 
procedure, see (von Hofsten, Dahlström, & Fredricksson, 2005).  
The stimuli consisted of four familiarization trials, followed by one of two test 
trials. All the stimuli, except for the first two familiarization trials, were identical to 
those used in our previous study (Southgate et al., 2007). The same familiarization trials 
were presented to all the participants, in the same order, and each participant observed 
one of two versions of the test trial (FB1 or FB2). The general setup of the scene was 
the same for all trials: An actor was seated behind a panel containing two windows, and 
in front of each window there was an opaque box with a lid (Figure 1).  
The purpose of the familiarization trials was (1) to show that the actor’s goal 
was to obtain the ball, and (2) to teach the child the contingency between the windows 
being illuminated and a corresponding ‘chime’ sound, and the subsequent opening of 
one of the windows by the actor. Two additional familiarization trials were included at 
the beginning of the study to maximize the chances that children would learn this 
contingency by the test trial (see Results). In both of these extra familiarization trials, 
participants saw a red toy whale sitting on top of the left-hand (trial 1) or right-hand 
(trial 2) box. Both windows were then illuminated and a chime sounded. After a 
1750-ms delay, the actor reached through the window behind the box on which the toy 
whale sat (Figure 1a). The third familiarization trial started with the actor watching a 
puppet as it appeared, opened the lid of the left-hand box, placed a brightly coloured 
ball in the box, closed the lid and disappeared. After the puppet disappeared, the two 
windows were illuminated and a chime sounded as in the preceding familiarization 
trials. Again, after a 1750-ms delay, the actor reached through the left-hand window, 
opened the lid of the left-hand box, reached into it and retrieved the ball (Figure 1b). 
The fourth familiarization trial was identical to the third familiarization trial except that 
the puppet put the ball in the right-hand box, the actor reached for the right-hand box 
and the video stopped at the point when the actor’s hand made contact with the lid of 
the box. 
In the FB1 condition (Figure 1c), the puppet appeared at the centre of the stage, 
deposited the ball in the left-hand box and returned to the centre. The puppet then went 
back to the left-hand box, opened the lid, took the ball and placed it in the centre. The 
puppet then opened the lid of the right-hand box, retrieved the ball and put it inside the 
box, and closed the lid. The puppet then returned to the left-hand box (while the actor’s 
attention followed), closed the lid and disappeared. At this point, the sound of a phone 
ringing was played and the actor turned around as if she was attending to this sound. As 
soon as the actor turned away, the puppet reappeared, opened the right-hand box, 
retrieved the ball, closed the lid and disappeared with the ball. If the participants could 
represent the actor’s false belief, they should be able to deduce that (1) the ball is no 
longer in the right-hand box, but (2) the actor did not see it disappear, therefore (3) she 
should have the false belief that the ball is still in the right-hand box. On the basis of 
this false belief attribution, children should predict that (4) the actor would reach 
through the right-hand window once the window was illuminated. As soon as the 
puppet disappeared, the phone stopped ringing and the actor turned back. Then the 
windows were illuminated and a chime sounded. After that, the actor remained still for 
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the following 5 s. 
 
 
In the FB2 condition (Figure 1d), the puppet first placed the ball in the left-hand 
box and disappeared. This was immediately followed by the phone ringing, at which 
point the actor turned away. Then the puppet reappeared, took the ball out of the 
left-hand box and closed the lid. The puppet then placed the ball into the right-hand box, 
closed the lid and went back to the centre. Then the puppet returned to the right-hand 
Figure 1. Selected frames of from the events used in 
the experiment. White arrows indicate the relocation 
of the object. In the first familiarization trial (a), an 
object was placed on the left box. In the third 
familiarization trial (b), a puppet put the object into 
the left box. The second and the fourth familiarization 
trials were the same as the first and the third trials 
respectively, except that the object was placed to the 
right. In each case, the windows were then 
illuminated and then the actor reached through the 
window to the object. In the test trial, the puppet 
initially put the object in the left box, but the 
subsequent events differed between the conditions. In 
one condition (c), the puppet moved the object to the 
right box and then returned to the left box to close the 
lid; after the actor turned around, the puppet removed 
the object from the scene. In the other condition (d), 
the actor turned around before the puppet moved the 
object to the centre and then the right-hand box, and 
then removed the object from the scene. In both 
conditions, after the puppet removed the object, the 
actor turned back to the scene and the windows were 
illuminated. 
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box, removed the ball, closed the lid, and disappeared with the ball. If the participants 
could represent false beliefs, they should predict that the actor would reach through the 
left-hand window to the box in which the ball was placed as she was watching. As in 
the FB1 condition, once the puppet disappeared, the phone stopped ringing and the actor 
turned back. The windows were then illuminated and the chime sounded. After that, the 
actor remained still for the following 5 s. 
Several controls were incorporated to eliminate any cues which might affect 
participants’ looking behaviour. First, the actor wore a visor, which made the actor’s 
eyes invisible and prevented the participants from following, or attempting to follow, 
the actor’s eye gaze. Second, after turning back toward the stage in the test trials, the 
actor kept her head centered and made no movement, so as not to give any cues as to 
where she would search. Our previous study confirmed that, when asked, naïve adults 
were unable to correctly identify the window the actor would open based on the actor’s 
posture and movement after she turned back to the stage (Southgate et al., 2007). 
After the stimulus presentation, the experimenter asked the participants the 
following question: “Which window will the actor open?” to also obtain a verbally 
elicited measurement of the participants’ false belief understanding in this task. 
 
Standard False Belief Test (S-FB). Participants sat in front of a table, on which 
two boxes (one red and one blue) were set side by side. One of the two experimenters 
(Experimenter A) was seated next to the participant, and the other experimenter 
(Experimenter B) sat at the opposite side of the table, facing the participant and 
Experimenter A. Throughout the testing, Experimenter B manipulated a pair of puppets 
and a toy object to present ‘false-belief’ stories to the participant. Experimenter A 
monitored the participants, asked questions to the participants, and wrote down their 
verbal responses. To double-check participants’ responses, the whole testing session 
was recorded with a video camera, which was situated behind Experimenter B, facing 
the participant 
The testing consisted of three trials. Different pairs of puppets and a different 
object were used for each trial. Each trial consisted of five phases: (1) Experimenter B 
introduced one of the puppets (puppet A) to the participant. Puppet A then put an object 
into one of the boxes and disappeared underneath the table. (2) Experimenter B 
introduced the other puppet (puppet B) to the participant. Puppet B then took the object 
out of the box, put it into the other box, and disappeared. (3) Experimenter A asked the 
participants three questions to confirm their memory of the events so far. The questions 
were: “Which box is the [name of the object] in now?”, “ Who put the object in the 
box?”, and “In which box did [the name of puppet A] put the [name of the object]?”. (4) 
Puppet A appeared on the stage and said “Hello [name of participant]. I’m going to get 
the [name of object]!”. (5) Experimenter A asked the participant a question about the 
false belief of puppet A, which was: “To which box is [name of puppet A] going to go 
in order to get the [name of object]?”. After the participant's response, Experimenter A 
praised the participant regardless of their response. Then Experimenter B started the 
next trial with a different pair of puppets and a different toy object.  
 
Data reduction. Eye-tracking data from the ET-FB was analyzed as follows: 
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After recording, a gaze replay file showing the exact location of each participant’s gaze 
was exported at 25 frames per second with the ClearView program. From the exported 
data, the point of fixation was coded frame by frame starting from the point when the 
windows were illuminated to the end of stimulus presentation. Having obtained the total 
looking time to each of the two windows, a differential looking score (DLS) was 
calculated by subtracting the total looking time to the incorrect window from looking to 
the correct window, and by dividing it by the sum of looking time to correct and 
incorrect windows. The DLS can range between 1 and -1, being closer to 1 if the 
participant spent most time looking at the correct location, and closer to zero if the 
participant looked randomly to both windows. We also coded the direction of first 
saccade after the illumination of the windows. 
Children in the ET-FB task also showed characteristic gaze alternation between 
the actor and the puppet, which could reflect checking whether the actor is attending to 
the puppet’s actions. Thus, we coded the number of times that this ‘gaze checking’ 
occurred, i.e., the number of gaze alternations from the puppet to the actor from the 
point at which the actor looked away, to the point at which the actor turned back to the 
scene.  
 The number of correct responses in the three trials of S-FB were summed and 
used as the score of false belief understanding on a standard verbal test. 
 
Results 
To be included in the analyses, participants were required to understand the 
contingency between the illumining of the windows (and the chime) and the actor’s 
impending reaching, and had to display anticipatory looking toward the correct window 
by the fourth familiarization trial. Thus, only participants who looked longer to the 
correct, than the incorrect, window on this fourth familiarization trial were included in 
subsequent analyses. Preliminary analyses in the typically developing group found no 
effects of participants’ sex, and so data were pooled over this factor. Scores on the S-FB 
test were analyzed using an independent samples t-test, and the scores on the ET-FB 
task were analyzed using a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group (ASD 
or TD) and condition (FB1 or FB2) as between-subjects factors.  
As predicted, we found a significant group difference on the S-FB task (mean 
score: 2.35 in TD, and 1.41 in ASD children, t (27) = 2.19, p = .038, Cohen’s d = 1.14). 
However, this difference did not remain significant when VMA was covaried out (F(1, 
26) = 1.29, p = .27, ηp2 = .047), which suggests that the group difference on the S-FB 
test in the current sample was mainly due to differences in verbal ability, as was also 
suggested in a meta-analysis by Happé (1995). Moreover, the group difference was also 
not significant when the participant’s score on the ET-FB task was covaried out (F(1, 
26) = 1.28, p = .27, ηp2 = .047). This suggests that the group difference on the S-FB task, 
at least within the age range of the current participants, can also be explained by the 
performance on the ET-FB. 
In the ET-FB task, children with ASD showed significantly lower DLS than did 
TD children (Figure 2, main effect of group: F(1, 25) = 11.10, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.31). In 
contrast to the S-FB task, the group difference in the ET-FB task remained significant 
when CA, VMA, RCPM, and even the participant’s score on the S-FB task were 
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covaried out (all Fs > 8.11, all ps < .009, all ηp2s > .25). These results indicate that the 
group differences in DLS in the ET-FB task cannot be explained by the performance on 
the S-FB task, the children's age, or by their verbal or non-verbal abilities. Follow-up 
t-tests for the ET-FB task revealed that TD children scored significantly above zero 
(mean: 0.43, t(16) = 4.53, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.10) while the DLS in children with 
ASD did not differ from zero (mean: -0.077, t(11) = -0.39, p = .70, Cohen’s d = 0.11). 
The main effect of condition was also significant in the two-way ANOVA (F(1, 25) = 
5.14, p = .032, ηp2 = .17), due to the higher scores in the FB1 than in the FB2 condition. 
This effect may indicate that, due to the longer duration of the events between the point 
when the actor looked away and when the she turned back, the FB2 situation demanded 
more memory than did the FB1 sequence. It is possible that such higher memory load 
may have impaired children's ability to keep track of the actor’s mental states. Note, 
however, that follow-up t-tests confirmed that TD children scored significantly above 
zero in both the FB1 (t(7) = 3.80, p = .007, Cohen’s d = 1.34) and the FB2 (t(9) = 2.74, 
p = .035, Cohen’s d = 0.91) conditions, but the scores of children with ASD did not 
differ from zero in either condition (both ts < 1.37, both ps > .30). The interaction 
between group and condition in the two-way ANOVA was not significant (F(1, 25) = 
0.90, p = .35, ηp2 = .035). 
 
 
 
Interestingly, children with ASD showed less gaze checking than did TD 
children (average frequency: 2.9 times for ASD and 5.3 times for TD, F(1, 25) = 6.04, p 
= .002, ηp2 = .20). This suggests that children with ASD were less attentive to the 
actor’s head direction than were the TD children, which may plausibly have affected the 
encoding of the knowledge status of the actor during the task. However, this reduced 
checking behaviour did not fully account for the group difference in DLS, because this 
difference remained significant even after the frequency of checking behaviour was 
covaried out (F(1, 24) = 9.20, p = .006, ηp2 = .28). Note also that the covariant (i.e., the 
checking frequency) was not significant in this analysis (F(1, 25) = 0.05, p = .82, ηp2 
Figure 2. Mean difference scores in action 
anticipation for each group and each condition. 
TD: typically developing children, ASD: children 
with autism spectrum disorder, FB1: false belief 
scenario 1, FB2: false belief scenario 2, **: p 
< .01, *: p < .05, error bar: standard error. 
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= .002). The main effect of condition was also significant in this analysis (F(1, 25) = 
5.27, p = .030, ηp2 = .17), probably because the FB2 condition included a longer period 
of the actor’s looking away than did the FB1 condition. The interaction between group 
and condition was not significant (F(1, 25) = 0.70, p = .41, ηp2 = .027). 
When we compared the number of children who made their first eye movement 
after the illumination of the windows towards the correct location, we did not find a 
significant difference between the groups (p = .39, Fisher's exact test, two-tailed). In 
fact, the number of children making a correct saccade first (11 children in the TD group 
and 5 children in the ASD group) was not significantly different from chance in either 
group. However, it may be more appropriate to assess anticipatory looking towards the 
correct location at the same delay (1750 ms) after window illumination as the children 
had experienced during the familiarization trials. Thus, we analyzed participants’ 
fixations between 1.5 s and 2 s after window illumination. Out of 17 TD children 
included in the analysis, 12 fixated at the correct window, 2 fixated at the incorrect 
window, 1 made a fixation to both of the windows, and the other 2 looked at the actor’s 
face, making no fixations to either window. Such asymmetric distribution of fixations 
was significantly different from chance (p = .013, McNemar test). For children with 
ASD, on the other hand, 4 fixated at the correct window, 4 fixated at the incorrect 
window, 2 made fixations to both windows, and the other 2 looked only at the actor’s 
face, which was not different from chance (p = 1.0, McNemar test). 
Fifteen out of 17 TD children gave the correct answer to the verbal question in 
the ET-FB task, which was significantly above chance (0.5) (p = .002, binominal test), 
whereas only 5 out of 12 children with ASD answered correctly, which did not differ 
from chance (0.5) (p = .77, binominal test). The group difference approached 
significance (p = .092, Fisher’s exact test, two-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
As with younger children (Southgate et al., 2007), the use of eye-tracking in the current 
study demonstrated that older TD children spontaneously anticipate an actor’s action 
based on her inferred false belief: they made longer fixations towards the correct 
window, particularly at the point when they had learned the actor was likely to open one 
of the windows and reach for the box. In fact, their score on the ET-FB task correlated 
significantly with performance on the S-FB task (Spearman’s ρ = .54, p = .023), 
strongly suggesting that, like the S-FB task, our ET-FB task taps the ability to attribute 
false beliefs. Children with ASD, on the other hand, did not show evidence of such 
spontaneous anticipatory looking on test trials. As all the children included in the final 
analyses exhibited correct anticipatory looking behaviour on the final familiarization 
trial, this failure was unlikely due to a general difficulty or lack of motivation to look in 
anticipation at locations where something is expected to happen, or to a difficulty in 
anticipating human actions in general. In addition, as the ET-FB task includes no verbal 
component and demands minimal executive functioning so that even 24-months-old 
toddlers can pass the task, it is highly unlikely that the lower performance of children 
with ASD in the ET-FB task stems from their deviance in verbal development (Happé, 
1995) or executive functioning (Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999). Moreover, the lack 
of anticipatory looking in the ASD group cannot be explained by their lower 
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performance on the standard false-belief task alone, because the group difference 
remained significant even when the scores on the S-FB task were covaried out. The 
results of the verbal control question corroborates the eye-tracking results by 
demonstrating that children with ASD, unlike control children, did not anticipate which 
window would open based on the actor’s mental states. 
There are several possible reasons why children with ASD fail to show 
anticipatory looking behaviour in this task. One possibility is that children with ASD 
are not motivated to monitor others’ mental states. Unlike previous studies, our task did 
not include any instruction but required that children spontaneously monitor others’ 
epistemic mental states in order to be able to anticipate their subsequent behaviour. 
Thus, it is possible that children with ASD did not exhibit correct anticipatory looking 
in our study because they lack the social motivation for tracking the actor's knowledge 
state that would have been a necessary prerequisite for successful performance (Dawson, 
Webb, & McPartland, 2005). In the current study, children with ASD showed less 
‘checking’ behaviour when the actor was looking away, which suggests that they were 
less attentive to the actor’s potential perceptual state. Note that this account does not 
entail that children with ASD would never anticipate actions. In fact, all the children 
included in the final sample correctly and spontaneously predicted the actor’s behaviour 
in the final familiarization trial, suggesting that they did anticipate the person’s 
behaviour based on her goal and the object's location. Ruffman, Garnham and Rideout 
(2001) also found that children with ASD tend to make less spontaneous anticipatory 
looking for social stimuli even when no false belief attribution is required. In their study, 
children were told stories, in which protagonists chose one of two locations based on 
their desire (i.e., the one where a desired object had been placed) or on social 
information (i.e., the one that the protagonist’s father had told was safe). In this 
situation, children with ASD tend to show less correct looking than control children, 
whereas the two groups performed equally in verbal measures. It is thus more likely that 
the difficulty of action anticipation in children with ASD is limited to situations that 
require spontaneous monitoring of others’ epistemic mental states.  
Another possibility is that individuals with ASD have a fundamentally cognitive 
(and perhaps modular) impairment in Theory of Mind (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 
2004). Ozonoff and Miller (1995) demonstrated that explicit and systematic teaching of 
social-cognitive principles can improve performance on the false belief task in children 
with ASD, but does not affect their social competence in daily life. They even argued 
that “we were more successful in teaching our subject to “hack out” rules and 
strategies to infer the mental states of others” (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995, p.429). In 
addition, Happe (1995) conducted a meta-analysis and found that children with ASD 
need more than twice (9.2 years) the VMA than TD children (4 years) to pass the 
standard false belief task. This could also suggest that children with ASD are using 
verbally mediated compensatory cognitive skills to succeed on false belief tasks. As the 
current ET-FB task involved no verbal cues or instructions that could have promoted the 
use of such compensatory strategies, children with ASD, who may have difficulty in 
attributing epistemic mental states, had no basis for predicting the actor’s behaviour. 
Whichever account proves to be a better explanation, the current results strongly 
suggest that the impairment in false belief understanding in children with ASD is not 
simply due to the difficulty in understanding verbal instruction, or in interpreting the 
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meaning of mental state verbs such as see, know or think. 
The current results suggest that the difficulty in passing the false belief task in 
children with ASD cannot be reduced to their delayed or deviant development of verbal 
skills (Happé, 1995) or executive functions (Russell et al., 1999). By contrast, the 
reduced spontaneous checking behaviour to the actor’s face during the task is consistent 
with recent literature suggesting atypical social orienting in children with ASD (Kikuchi, 
Senju, Tojo, Osanai, & Hasegawa, in press; Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & Jones, 
2009; Osterling, Dawson, & Munson, 2002). It may even suggest that the atypical 
development of theory of mind in ASD is based on an atypical pattern of social 
orienting, which is hypothesized to be caused by atypical functioning of subcortical 
structures such as amygdala, and its communication with cortical structures (e.g. 
Dawson et al., 2005; Johnson, 2005; Schultz, 2005). This hypothesis is consistent with 
neurological evidence suggesting the involvement of the amygdala in both theory of 
mind processing (Fine, Lumsden & Blair, 2001; Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane & 
Young, 2003) and social orienting (Adolphs, Gosselin, Buchanan, Tranel, Schyns, & 
Damasio, 2005; Spezio, Huang, Castelli, & Adolphs, 2007). However, further studies 
will be required to examine the relations between spontaneous checking behaviour and 
correct anticipation based on mental states, as the current study did not find a significant 
correlation between these measures and the difference in the frequency of face gaze did 
not account for the group differences in correct anticipation. 
A number of limitations in the current study make us cautious to generalize the 
current results beyond the range of the age and verbal/nonverbal skills of the children 
with ASD who participated in the current study. Firstly, due to the small sample size 
and the lack of quantitative measurements of autistic symptoms such as ADI or ADOS, 
it is difficult to clarify whether the performance in the current task relates to the degree 
of autistic symptoms or the difference between the subgroups (i.e. Autism, Asperger 
Disorder and PDD-NOS). Although this does not lessen the main result that children 
with ASD, as a group, did not demonstrate the correct anticipatory looking based on the 
actor’s false belief, further studies will be beneficial to explore the possible differences 
in the theory-of-mind skills within the ‘autism spectrum’.  
Secondly, because the participants with ASD in the current study also showed 
lower performance on the standard false belief task, possibly due to lower verbal MA, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that non-specific developmental characteristics, such 
as verbal MA, have affected the current results. Note that this does not mean that the 
current results can be explained by the higher verbal MA in the control group than the 
ASD group, mainly because our previous study has demonstrated that even 
25-months-old typically developing toddlers show correct anticipatory looking 
(Southgate et al., 2007). In addition, the group difference in ET-FB task remained 
significant when the VMA is covaried out. Moreover, another recent study has revealed 
that even adults with ASD, who easily pass standard FB tasks, still fail to show 
spontaneous anticipatory looking based on an actor’s false belief (Senju, Southgate, 
White & Frith, 2009), suggesting that high verbal MA does not necessarily result in 
successful spontaneous false belief attribution in ASD. Further studies will be beneficial 
with multiple control groups matched with chronological, verbal and nonverbal mental 
ages, as such matching has the potential to reveal further details of the cognitive profile 
of ASD (e.g. Burack et al., 2002; Russo et al., 2007). In addition, even though we did 
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not find any effect of participants’ gender in the current study, further studies with 
larger sample sizes would be necessary for exploring gender differences which do not 
always have large effect sizes. 
To conclude, the current study demonstrates that children with ASD, at least in 
the age range included in the current study, fail to spontaneously anticipate others' 
actions when such anticipation requires the attribution of a false belief to the actor. Thus, 
these results suggest an impairment in mentalizing skills in these children that is 
independent of their verbal abilities. The development of nonverbal tasks has opened up 
new opportunities to examine the early development of theory of mind not only in 
typical development, but also, as demonstrated here, in atypical development such as 
ASD. Further research is needed to explore whether one can detect the impairment in 
theory of mind in much younger children with ASD and whether such early 
impairments predict later manifestation of autistic symptoms. In addition, the positive 
correlation between the performance on our nonverbal tasks and the traditional false 
belief task opens up a real possibility for use with patients with language difficulties as 
well as pre-verbal children. The current results have demonstrated that the ET-FB task 
can be applied to school-aged children as well as toddlers, which make it a feasible tool 
for assessing the developmental trajectory of the capacity to encode false belief from 
early childhood to adulthood (Senju et al., 2009).  
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